Undersea internet cables connecting Asia, the Middle East, and Europe face a new threat from Iran, which has proposed taxing and controlling the fiber-optic lines passing through the Strait of Hormuz. In May 2026, IRGC-linked media outlets Tasnim and Fars published detailed plans to generate revenue from these critical infrastructure assets, escalating regional tensions beyond oil and shipping into the digital realm.
Key Takeaways
- IRGC-linked Tasnim and Fars proposed Iran charge licensing fees and toll payments for undersea cables transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
- At least seven cables carry more than 99% of international internet communications through the strait, including traffic for Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon.
- Cables allegedly carry more than $10 trillion in financial transactions daily, though this figure comes from IRGC-linked media without independent verification.
- Iran cited Egypt’s Telecom Egypt model, which collects transit fees on cables between the Red Sea and Mediterranean.
- Proposals would require foreign tech companies to operate under Iranian law and grant exclusive maintenance rights to Iranian firms.
What Iran Is Actually Proposing
Tasnim’s May 9-10, 2026 article titled “Three practical steps for generating revenue from Strait of Hormuz internet cables” outlines a three-step revenue scheme. Step one involves charging foreign companies initial licensing fees and annual renewal payments. Step two requires major technology firms—specifically naming Meta, Amazon, and Microsoft—to operate under Iranian law. Step three grants Iranian companies exclusive control over cable maintenance and repair operations. These proposals would fundamentally reshape how global internet infrastructure functions in one of the world’s most critical chokepoints.
Fars News Agency published similar proposals on social media, emphasizing permit requirements and toll payments for cable passage. Both outlets framed the measures as turning the Strait of Hormuz into what Tasnim called a “strategic center for legitimate wealth creation.” Fars went further, describing Hormuz as Iran’s “hidden highway” and a potential “digital power” lever—language that reveals how Tehran views control of these cables as a strategic asset equivalent to its oil chokepoint control.
The Scale of What’s at Stake
Undersea internet cables are the backbone of global finance and communication. More than 99% of international internet communications travel through these fiber-optic lines, making them far more critical than satellite internet or terrestrial networks. At least seven cables connect Asia, the Middle East, and Europe through the Strait of Hormuz alone, and the Strait handles roughly 20% of the world’s data and financial traffic. The cables carry transactions for every major cloud provider and financial institution on Earth.
Tasnim claims these cables pulse with more than $10 trillion in financial transactions daily. While this figure originates from IRGC-linked media without independent verification, it illustrates the scale of economic activity at stake. Even if the actual number is lower, disrupting or taxing these cables would ripple across global markets instantly. A single outage can crash cryptocurrency exchanges, delay stock trades, and disrupt cloud services for millions of users worldwide.
The Egyptian Precedent and Iran’s Strategic Authority
Iran is not inventing this playbook from scratch. The proposals explicitly cite Egypt as a model. State-owned Telecom Egypt participates in the undersea cable business and collects transit fees on cables passing through Egyptian territory between the Red Sea and Mediterranean. This precedent gives Iran a template—and a veneer of legitimacy—for its own toll-collection scheme.
More significantly, Iran has already established the Persian Gulf and Strait Authority to oversee and manage undersea cables as a national strategic asset, according to Pakistani media reports. This institutional framework suggests the proposals are not idle rhetoric but part of a broader strategy to weaponize digital infrastructure. The authority’s existence indicates Iran intends to enforce such policies if it gains the leverage to do so.
Why This Threatens Global Stability
Unlike Egypt’s Red Sea tolls, which affect a smaller subset of cables and face less geopolitical friction, Iran’s proposal targets cables during a period of US-Iran tensions and regional instability. The Strait of Hormuz is already one of the world’s most militarized waterways. Adding digital control and taxation to Iran’s existing chokehold on oil shipping transforms the strait into a dual-leverage point—physical and virtual.
If Iran were to implement these policies or threaten cable disruption, it could extort payments from tech companies, hold financial markets hostage, or weaponize internet access against regional adversaries. The proposals also demand that foreign companies operate under Iranian law, a requirement that would expose Meta, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft to Iranian surveillance, data seizure, and political pressure. No Western tech company can realistically accept such terms, making the proposals either a negotiating tactic or a prelude to forced compliance through cable seizure or sabotage.
What Happens Next
As of May 2026, these proposals have not been enacted or formally adopted as Iranian government policy. However, the fact that IRGC-linked media published them signals intent and tests international reaction. Such proposals typically precede policy shifts in Tehran—the media outlets float ideas, gauge responses, and escalate gradually. The establishment of the Persian Gulf and Strait Authority suggests the infrastructure for enforcement already exists.
Cable operators and tech companies have not yet responded publicly with coordinated pressure or diplomatic channels. The proposals remain in a gray zone: serious enough to be alarming, but not yet formalized enough to trigger immediate sanctions or military response. This window may not last. If Iran moves to tax or seize cables, the global internet economy faces its first major chokepoint crisis since the invention of undersea fiber-optic infrastructure.
Could Iran Actually Enforce This?
Iran lacks the military capacity to physically seize cables or defend them against US or allied naval intervention. However, it could damage cables through sabotage, threaten disruption credibly enough to force negotiations, or use the authority as leverage in broader hostage-taking scenarios. The real risk is not that Iran succeeds in permanent control—it is that the threat alone destabilizes cable investment, forces rerouting costs, or triggers military escalation in the Strait.
Do undersea internet cables really carry that much financial traffic?
Tasnim claims cables carry more than $10 trillion in daily financial transactions, though this figure comes from IRGC-linked media without independent verification from financial regulators or cable operators. Undersea cables absolutely carry the majority of global financial transactions, but the specific $10 trillion daily figure should be treated as a propaganda claim rather than audited fact.
Has Iran actually implemented these fees yet?
No. As of May 2026, the proposals remain statements of intent from IRGC-linked media outlets. Iran has established the Persian Gulf and Strait Authority to manage cables, but no fees or taxes have been formally enacted or collected. The proposals are a threat, not yet a reality.
Why is Egypt’s model different from Iran’s proposal?
Egypt’s Telecom Egypt collects transit fees on cables passing through Egyptian territory between the Red Sea and Mediterranean, a model Iran explicitly cites. The key difference is geopolitical: Egypt operates in a more stable region with less US-Iran tension, and Egyptian fees apply to a smaller number of cables. Iran’s proposal targets a major global chokepoint during active regional conflict, making the threat far more destabilizing to international finance and tech infrastructure.
Iran’s push to control undersea internet cables represents a dangerous escalation of Strait of Hormuz tensions into the digital economy. While the proposals may not be implemented immediately, they signal intent and reveal how Tehran views infrastructure control as a strategic weapon. Tech companies, cable operators, and governments must take these statements seriously and begin contingency planning for a world where internet access becomes another hostage in geopolitical disputes.
Edited by the All Things Geek team.
Source: Tom's Hardware
